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Abstract
We consider the problem of a single seller repeatedly selling a single item to a single buyer
(specifically, the buyer has a value drawn fresh from known distribution D in every round).
Prior work assumes that the buyer is fully rational and will perfectly reason about how their
bids today affect the seller’s decisions tomorrow. In this work we initiate a different direction:
the buyer simply runs a no-regret learning algorithm over possible bids. We provide a fairly
complete characterization of optimal auctions for the seller in this domain. Specifically:
• If the buyer bids according to EXP3 (or any “mean-based” learning algorithm), then the
seller can extract expected revenue arbitrarily close to the expected welfare. This auction
is independent of the buyer’s valuation D, but somewhat unnatural as it is sometimes in
the buyer’s interest to overbid.
• There exists a learning algorithm A such that if the buyer bids according to A then the
optimal strategy for the seller is simply to post the Myerson reserve for D every round.
• If the buyer bids according to EXP3 (or any “mean-based” learning algorithm), but the
seller is restricted to “natural” auction formats where overbidding is dominated (e.g. Gen-
eralized First-Price or Generalized Second-Price), then the optimal strategy for the seller
is a pay-your-bid format with decreasing reserves over time. Moreover, the seller’s optimal
achievable revenue is characterized by a linear program, and can be unboundedly better
than the best truthful auction yet simultaneously unboundedly worse than the expected
welfare.
∗Department of Computer Science, Princeton University, email: mbraverm@cs.princeton.edu. Research supported
in part by an NSF CAREER award (CCF-1149888), NSF CCF-1215990, NSF CCF-1525342, NSF CCF-1412958, a
Packard Fellowship in Science and Engineering, and the Simons Collaboration on Algorithms and Geometry.
†Department of Computer Science, Princeton University, email: jiemingm@cs.princeton.edu.
‡Department of Computer Science, Princeton University, email: js44@cs.princeton.edu
§Department of Computer Science, Princeton University, email: smweinberg@princeton.edu. Supported by NSF
CCF-1717899.
1 Introduction
Consider a bidder trying to decide how much to bid in an auction (for example, a sponsored
search auction). If the auction happens to be the truthful Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction [Vic61,
Cla71, Gro73], then the bidder’s decision is easy: simply bid your value. If instead, the bidder is
participating in a Generalized First-Price (GFP) or Generalized Second-Price (GSP) auction, the
optimal strategy is less clear. Bidders can certainly attempt to compute a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
of the associated game and play accordingly, but this is unrealistic due to the need for accurate
priors and extensive computation.
Alternatively, the bidders may try to learn a best-response over time (possibly offloading the
learning to commercial bid optimizers). We specifically consider bidders who no-regret learn, as
empirical work of Nekipelov et al. [NST15] shows that bidder behavior on Bing is largely consistent
with no-regret learning (i.e. for most bidders, there exists a per-click value such that their behavior
guarantees no-regret for this value). From the perspective of a revenue-maximizing auction designer,
this motivates the following question: If a seller knows that buyers are no-regret learning
over time, how should they maximize revenue?
This question is already quite interesting even when there is just a single item for sale to a
single buyer.1 We consider a model where in every round t, the seller solicits a bid bt ∈ [0, 1] from
the buyer, then allocates the item according to some allocation rule xt(·) and charges the bidder
according to some pricing rule pt(·) (satisfying pt(b) ≤ b ·xt(b) for all t, b). Note that the allocation
and pricing rules (henceforth, auction) can differ from round to round, and that the auction need
not be truthful. Each round, the bidder has a value vt drawn independently from D, and uses some
no-regret learning algorithm to decide which bid to place in round t, based on the outcomes in
rounds 1, . . . , t− 1 (we will make clear exactly what it means for a buyer with changing valuation
to play no-regret in Section 2, but one can think of vt as providing a “context” for the bidder during
round t).
One default strategy for the seller is to simply to set Myerson’s revenue-optimal reserve price
for D, r(D), in every round (that is, xt(bt) = I(bt ≥ r(D)), pt(bt) = r(D) · I(bt ≥ r(D)) for all
t, where I(·) is the indicator function). It’s not hard to see that any no-regret learning algorithm
will eventually learn to submit a winning bid during all rounds where vt > r(D), and a losing bid
whenever vt < r(D). So if Rev(D) denotes the expected revenue of the optimal reserve price when
a single buyer is drawn from D, the default strategy guarantees the seller revenue T ·Rev(D)−o(T )
over T rounds. The question then becomes whether or not the seller can beat this benchmark, and
if so by how much.
The answer to this question isn’t a clear-cut yes or no, so let’s start with the following in-
stantiation: how much revenue can the seller extract if the buyer runs EXP3 [ACBFS03]? In
Theorem 3.1, we show that the seller can actually do much better than the default strategy: it’s
possible to extract revenue per round equal to (almost) the full expected welfare! That is, if
Val(D) = Ev←D[v], there exists an auction that extracts revenue T · Val(D) − o(T ) for all D.2 It
turns out this result holds not only for EXP3, but for any learning algorithm with the following
(roughly stated) property: if at time t, the mean reward of action a is significantly larger than the
mean reward of action b, the learning algorithm will choose action b with negligible probability.
1And also surprisingly relevant: search engines don’t generally publish their formulas for setting reserves. So even
if you are the only bidder for a certain keyword (e.g. the name of your new startup), you’re likely participating in
a GSP/GFP auction with no additional bidders, but against a seller who adaptively sets the reserve price based on
past bids. Anecdotal evidence indeed suggests that the reserve prices in such single-bidder auctions will change over
time.
2The order of quantifiers in this sentence is correct: it is actually the same auction format that works for all D.
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We call a learning algorithm with this property a “mean-based” learning algorithm and note that
many commonly used learning algorithms - EXP3, Multiplicative Weights Update [AHK12], and
Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader [Han57, KV02, KV05] - are ‘mean-based’ (see Section 2 for a formal
definition).
We postpone all intuition until Section 3.1 with a worked-through example, but just note here
that the auction format is quite unnatural: it “lures” the bidder into submitting high bids early
on by giving away the item for free, and then charging very high prices (but still bounded in [0, 1])
near the end. The transition from “free” to “high-price” is carefully coordinated across different
bids to achieve the revenue guarantee.
This result motivates two further directions. First, do there exist other no-regret algorithms
for which full surplus extraction is impossible for the seller? In Theorem 3.2, we show that the
answer is yes. In fact, there is a simple no-regret algorithm A, such that when the bidder uses
algorithm A to bid, the default strategy (set the Myerson reserve every round) is optimal for the
seller. We again postpone a formal statement and intuition to Section 3.2, but just note here that
the algorithm is a natural adaptation of EXP3 (or in fact, any existing no-regret algorithm) to our
setting.
Finally, it is reasonable to expect that bidders might use off-the-shelf no-regret learning algo-
rithms like EXP3, so it is still important to understand what the seller can hope to achieve if the
buyer is specifically using such a “mean-based” algorithm (formal definition in Section 2). Theo-
rem 3.1 is perhaps unsatisfying in this regard because the proposed auction is so unnatural, and
looks nothing like the GSP or GFP auctions that initially motivated this study. It turns out that
the key property separating GFP/GSP from the unnatural auction above is whether overbidding
is a dominated strategy. That is, in our unnatural auction, if the bidder truly hopes to guarantee
low regret they must seriously consider overbidding (and this is how the auction lures them into
bidding way above their value). In both GSP and GFP, overbidding is dominated, so the bidder
can guarantee no regret while overbidding with probability 0 in every round.
The final question we ask is the following: if the buyer is using EXP3 (or any “mean-based”
algorithm), but only considering undominated strategies, how much revenue can the seller extract
using an auction where overbidding is dominated in every round? It turns out that the auctioneer
can still outperform the default strategy, but not extract full welfare. Instead, we identify a linear
program (as a function of D) that tightly characterizes the optimal revenue the seller can achieve
in this setting when the buyer’s values are drawn from D. Moreover, we show that the auction that
achieves this guarantee is natural, and can be thought of as a first-price auction with decreasing
reserves over time. Finally, we show that this “mean-based revenue” benchmark, MBRev(D) lies
truly in between the Myerson revenue and the expected welfare: for all c, there exists a distribution
D over values such that c · T · Rev(D) < MBRev(D) < 1c · T · Val(D). In other words, the seller’s
mean-based revenue may be unboundedly better than the default strategy, yet simultaneously
unboundedly far from the expected welfare. We provide formal statements and a detailed proof
overview of these results in Section 3.3. To briefly recap, our main results are the following:
1. If the buyer uses a “mean-based” learning algorithm like EXP3, the seller can extract revenue
(1− ε)T · Val(D)− o(T ) for any constant ε > 0 (Theorem 3.1).
2. There exists a natural no-regret algorithmA such that when the buyer bids according toA, the
seller’s default strategy (charging the Myerson reserve every round) is optimal (Theorem 3.2).
3. If the buyer uses a “mean-based” algorithm only over undominated strategies, the seller can
extract revenue MBRev(D) using an auction where overbidding is dominated in every round.
Moreover, we characterize MBRev(D) as the value of a linear program, and show it can be
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simultaneously unboundedly better than T · Rev(D) and unboundedly worse than T · Val(D)
(Theorems 3.4, 3.3 and 3.5).
Our plan for the remaining sections is as follows. Below, we overview our connection to related
work. Section 2 formally defines our model. Section 3 works through a concrete example, providing
intuition for all three results. Section 4 discusses conclusions and open problems.
1.1 Related Work
There are two lines of work that are most related to ours. The first is that of dynamic auctions,
such as [PPPR16, ADH16, MLTZ16a, MLTZ16b, LP17]. Like our model, there are T rounds where
the seller has a single item for sale to a single buyer, whose value is drawn from some distribution
every round. However, the buyer is fully strategic and processes fully how their choices today affect
the seller’s decisions tomorrow (e.g. they engage with deals of the form “pay today to get the item
tomorrow”). Additional closely related work is that of Devanur et al. studying the Fishmonger
problem [DPS15, ILPT17]. Here, there is again a single buyer and seller, and T rounds of sale.
Unlike our model, the buyer draws a value from D once during round 0 and that value is fixed
through all T rounds (so the seller could try to learn the buyer’s value over time). Also unlike our
model, they study perfect Bayesian equilibria (where again the buyer is fully strategic, and reasons
about how their actions today affect the seller’s behavior tomorrow).
In contrast to these works, while buyers in our model do care about the future (e.g. they
value learning), they don’t reason about how their actions today might affect the seller’s decisions
tomorrow. Our model is more realistic for sponsored search auctions, where search engines rarely
release proprietary algorithms for setting reserves based on past data (and fully strategic reasoning
is simply impossible without the necessary information).
Other related work considers the Price of Anarchy of simple combinatorial auctions when bid-
ders no-regret learn [Rou12, ST13, NST15, DS16]. One key difference between this line of work
and ours is that these all study welfare maximization for combinatorial auctions with rich valuation
functions. In contrast, our work studies revenue maximization while selling a single item. Addi-
tionally, in these works the seller commits to a publicly known auction format, and the only reason
for learning is due to the strategic behavior of other buyers. In contrast, buyers in our model have
to learn even when they are the only buyer, due to the strategic nature of the seller.
Recent work has also considered learning from the perspective of the seller. In these works, the
buyer’s (or buyers’) valuations are drawn from an unknown distribution, and the seller’s goal is
to learn an approximately optimal auction with as few samples as possible [CR14, DHP16, MR15,
MR16, GN17, CD17, DHL+17]. These works consider numerous different models and achieve a
wide range of guarantees, but all study the learning problem from the perspective of the seller,
whereas the buyer is simply myopic and participates in only one round. In contrast, it is the buyer
in our model who does the learning (and there is no information for the seller to learn: the buyer’s
values are drawn fresh in every round).
Finally, no-regret learning in online decision problems is an extremely well-studied problem.
When feedback is revealed for every possible action, one well-known solution is the multiplicative
weight update rule which has been rediscovered and applied in many fields (see survey [AHK12] for
more details). Another algorithmic scheme for the online decision problem is known as Follow the
Perturbed Leader [Han57, KV02, KV05]. When only feedback for the selected action is revealed,
the problem is referred to as the multi-armed bandit problem. Here, similar ideas to the MWU
rule are used in developing the EXP3 algorithm [ACBFS03] for adversarial bandit model, and also
for the contextual bandit problem [LZ08]. Our algorithm in Theorem 3.2 bears some similarities to
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the low swap regret algorithm introduced in [BM07]. See the survey [BC12] for more details about
the multi-armed bandit problem. Our results hold in both models (i.e. whether the buyer receives
feedback for every bid they could have made, or only the bid they actually make), so we will make
use of both classes of algorithms.
In summary, while there is already extensive work related to repeated sales in auctions, and even
no-regret learning with respect to auctions (from both the buyer and seller perspective), our work
is the first to address how a seller might adapt their selling strategy when faced with a no-regret
buyer.
2 Model and Preliminaries
We consider a setting with 1 buyer and 1 seller. There are T rounds, and in each round the seller
has one item for sale. At the start of each round t, the buyer’s value v(t) (known only to the
buyer) for the item is drawn independently from some distribution D (known to both the seller
and the buyer). For simplicity, we assume D has a finite support3 of size m, supported on values
0 ≤ v1 < v2 < · · · < vm ≤ 1. For each i ∈ [m], vi has probability qi of being drawn under D.
The seller then presents K options for the buyer, which can be thought of as “possible bids”
(we will interchangeably refer to these as options, bids, or arms throughout the paper, depending
on context). Each arm i is labelled with a bid value bi ∈ [0, 1], with b1 < . . . , < bK . Upon pulling
this arm at round t, the buyer receives the item with some allocation probability ai,t, and must pay
a price pi,t ∈ [0, ai,t · bi]. These values ai,t and pi,t are chosen by the seller during time t, but remain
unknown to the buyer until he plays an arm, upon which he learns the values for that arm. All of
our positive results (i.e. strategies for the seller) are non-adaptive (in some places called oblivious),
in the sense that that ai,t, pi,t are set before the first round starts. All of our negative results (i.e.
upper bounds on how much a seller can possibly attain) hold even against fully adaptive sellers,
where ai,t and pi,t can be set even after learning the distribution of arms the buyer intends to pull
in round t.
In order for the selling strategies to possibly represent sponsored search auctions, we require
the allocation/price rules to be monotone. That is, if i > j, then for all t, ai,t ≥ aj,t and pi,t ≥ pj,t.
In other words, bidding higher should result in a (weakly) higher probability of receiving the item
and (weakly) higher expected payment. We’ll also insist on the existence of an arm 0 with bid
b0 = 0 and a0,t = 0 for all t; i.e., an arm which charges nothing but does not give the item. Playing
this arm can be thought of as not participating in the auction.
We’ll be interested in one final property of allocation/price rules that we call critical, and
buyer behavior that we call clever. We won’t require that all auctions considered be critical, but
this is an important property that greatly affects the optimal revenue that a seller can extract (see
Theorems 3.1 and 3.3).
Definition 2.1 (Clever Bidder). We say that a bidder is clever if they never play a dominated
strategy. That is, they still no-regret learn, but only over the set of bids which are not dominated.
Definition 2.2 (Critical Auction). A vector of allocation/price rules (over all t ∈ [T ]) is critical
if for all t, overbidding is a dominated strategy.
The above definition captures the property that in many auctions like GFP and GSP (both of
which are critical), it makes no sense for a buyer to ever play dominated strategies - they need
3If D instead has infinite support, all our results hold approximately after discretization to multiples of ε. If D is
bounded in [0, H ], then all our results hold after normalizing D by dividing by H .
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only learn over the undominated strategies. Note that if overbidding is strictly dominated, any
low-regret or mean-based learning algorithm will quickly learn not to overbid, and therefore play
similarly to clever bidders in critical auctions.
2.1 Bandits and experts
Our goal is to understand the behavior of such mechanisms when the buyer plays according to some
no-regret strategy for the multi-armed bandit problem. In the classic multi-armed bandit problem
a learner (in our case, the buyer) chooses one of K arms per round, over T rounds. On round t,
the learner receives a reward ri,t ∈ [0, 1] for pulling arm i (where the values ri,t are possibly chosen
adversarially). The learner’s goal is to maximize his total reward.
Let It denote the arm pulled by the principal at round t. The regret of an algorithm A for the
learner is the random variable Reg(A) = maxi
∑T
t=1 ri,t−
∑T
t=1 rIt,t. We say an algorithm A for the
multi-armed bandit problem is δ-no-regret if E[Reg(A)] ≤ δ (where the expectation is taken over
the randomness of A). We say an algorithm A is no-regret if it is δ-no-regret for some δ = o(T ).
In the multi-armed bandits setting, the learner only learns the value ri,t for the arm i which he
pulls on round t. In our setting, the learner will learn ai,t and pi,t explicitly (from which they can
compute ri,t). Our results (both positive and negative) also hold when the learner learns the value
ri,t for all arms i (we refer this full-information setting as the experts setting, in contrast to the
partial-information bandits setting). Simple no-regret algorithms exist in both the experts setting
and the bandits setting. Of special interest in this paper will be a class of learning algorithms for
the bandits problem and experts problem which we term ‘mean-based’.
Definition 2.3 (Mean-Based Learning Algorithm). Let σi,t =
∑t
s=1 ri,s. An algorithm for the
experts problem or multi-armed bandits problem is γ-mean-based if it is the case that whenever
σi,t < σj,t − γT , then the probability that the algorithm pulls arm i on round t is at most γ. We
say an algorithm is mean-based if it is γ-mean-based for some γ = o(1).
Intuitively, ‘mean-based’ algorithms will rarely pick an arm whose current mean is significantly
worse than the current best mean. Many no-regret algorithms, including commonly used variants
of EXP3 (for the bandits setting), the Multiplicative Weights algorithm (for the experts setting)
and the Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader algorithm (experts setting), are mean-based (Appendix D).
Contextual bandits
In our setting, the buyer has the additional information of their current value for the item, and
hence is actually facing a contextual bandits problem. In (our variant of) the contextual bandits
problem, each round t the learner is additionally provided with a context ct drawn from some
distribution D supported on a finite set C (in our setting, ct = v(t), the buyer’s valuation for
the item at time t). The adversary now specifies rewards ri,t(c), the reward the learner receives
if he pulls arm i on round t while having context c. If we are in the full-information (experts)
setting, the learner learns the values of ri,t(ct) for all arms i after round t, where as if we are in the
partial-information (bandits) setting, the learner only learns the value of ri,t(ct) for the arm i that
he pulled.
In the contextual bandits setting, we now define the regret of an algorithm A in terms of
regret against the best “context-specific” policy π; that is, Reg(A) = maxπ:C→[K]
∑T
t=1 rπ(ct),t(ct)−∑T
t=1 rIt,t(ct), where again It is the arm pulled by M on round t. As before, we say an algorithm
is δ-low regret if E[Reg(M)] ≤ δ, and say an algorithm is no-regret if it is δ-no-regret for some
δ = o(T ).
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If the size of the context set C is constant with respect to T , then there is a simple way to
construct a no-regret algorithm M ′ for the contextual bandits problem from a no-regret algorithm
M for the classic bandits problem: simply maintain a separate instance of M for every different
context v ∈ C (in the contextual bandits literature, this is sometimes referred to as the S-EXP3
algorithm [BC12]). We call the algorithm we obtain this way its contextualization, and denote it
as cont(M).
If we start with a mean-based learning algorithm, then we can show that its contextualization
satisfies an analogue of the mean-based property for the contextual-bandits problem (proof in
Appendix D).
Definition 2.4 (Mean-Based Contextual Learning Algorithm). Let σi,t(c) =
∑t
s=1 ri,s(c). An
algorithm for the contextual bandits problem is γ-mean-based if it is the case that whenever σi,t(c) <
σj,t(c)− γT , then the probability pi,t(c) that the algorithm pulls arm i on round t if it has context c
satisfying pi,t(c) < γ. We say an algorithm is mean-based if it is γ-mean-based for some γ = o(1).
Theorem 2.5. If an algorithm for the experts problem or multi-armed bandits problem is mean-
based, then its contextualization is also a mean-based algorithm for the contextual bandits problem.
2.2 Welfare and monopoly revenue
In order to evaluate the performance of our mechanisms for the seller, we will compare the revenue
the seller obtains to two benchmarks from the single-round setting of a seller selling a single item
to a buyer with value drawn from distribution D.
The first benchmark we consider is the welfare of the buyer, the expected value the buyer assigns
to the item. This quantity clearly upper bounds the expected revenue that the seller can hope to
extract per round.
Definition 2.6. The welfare, Val(D) is equal to Ev∼D[v].
The second benchmark we consider is the monopoly revenue, the maximum possible revenue
attainable by the seller in one round against a rational buyer. Seminal work of Myerson [Mye81]
shows that this revenue is attainable by setting a fixed price (“monopoly/Myerson reserve”) for the
item, and hence can be characterized as follows.
Definition 2.7. The monopoly revenue (alternatively, Myerson revenue) Mye(D) is equal to maxp p·
Prv∼D[v ≥ p].
2.3 A final note on the model
For concreteness, we chose to phrase our problem as one where a single bidder whose value is
repeatedly drawn independently from D each round engages in no-regret learning with their value
as context. Alternatively, we could imagine a population of m different buyers, each with a fixed
value vi. Each round, exactly one buyer arrives at the auction, and it is buyer i with probability qi.
The buyers are indistinguishable to the seller, and each buyer no-regret learns (without context,
because their value is always vi). This model is mathematically equivalent to ours, so all of our
results hold in this model as well if the reader prefers this interpretation instead.
3 An Illustrative Example
In this section, we overview an illustrative example to show the difference between mean-based
and non-mean-based learning algorithms, and between critical and arbitrary auctions. We will not
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prove all claims in this section (nor carry out all calculations) as it is only meant to illustrate and
provide intuition. Throughout this section, the running example will be when D samples 1/4 with
probability 1/2, 1/2 with probability 1/4, and 1 with probability 1/4. Note that Val(D) = 1/2 and
Rev(D) = 1/4.
3.1 Mean-Based Learning and Arbitrary Auctions
Let’s first consider what the seller can do with an arbitrary (not critical) auction when the buyer
is running a mean-based learning algorithm like EXP3. The seller will let the buyer bid 0 or 1. If
the buyer bids 0, they pay nothing but do not receive the item (recall that an arm of this form is
required). If the buyer bids 1 in round t, they receive the item and pay some price pt as follows:
for the first half of the game (1 ≤ t ≤ T/2), the seller sets pt = 0. For the second half of the game
(T/2 < t ≤ T ), the seller sets pt = 1.
Let’s examine the behaviour of the buyer, recalling that they run a mean-based learning algo-
rithm, and therefore (almost) always pull the arm with highest cumulative utility. The buyer with
value 1 will happily bid 1 all the way through, since he is always offered the item for less than
or equal to his value for the item. The buyer with value 1/2 will bid 1 for the first T/2 rounds,
accumulating a surplus (i.e., negative regret) of 1/2 per round. For the next T/2 rounds, this
surplus slowly disappears at the rate of 1/2 per round until it disappears at time T , so the bidder
with value 1/2 will bid 1 all the way through. Finally, the bidder with value 1/4 will bid 1 for the
first T/2 rounds, accumulating surplus at a rate of 1/4 per round. After round T/2, this surplus
decreases at a rate of 3/4 per round, until at round 2T/3 his cumulative utility from bidding 1
reaches 0 and he switches to bidding 0.
Now let’s compute the revenue. From round T/2 through 2T/3, the buyer always buys the item
at a price of 1, so the seller obtains T/6 revenue. Finally, from round 2T/3 through T , the buyer
purchases the item with probability 1/2 and pays 1. The total revenue is 0 + T/6 + T/6 = T/3.
Note that if the seller used the default strategy, they would extract revenue only T/4.
Where did our extra revenue come from? First, note that the welfare of the buyer in this
example is quite high: the bidder gets the item the whole way through when v ≥ 1/2, and two-
thirds of the way through when v = 1/4. One reason why the welfare is so high is because we give
the item away for free in the early rounds. But notice also that the utility of the buyer is quite low:
the buyer actually has zero utility when v ≤ 1/2, and utility 1/2 when v = 1. The reason we’re
able to keep the utility low, despite giving the item away for free in the early rounds is because we
overcharge the bidders in later rounds (and they choose to overpay, exactly because their learning
is mean-based).
In fact, by offering additional options to the buyer, we show that it is possible for the seller to
extract up to the full welfare from the buyer (e.g. a net revenue of T/2−o(T ) for this example). As
in the above example, our mechanism makes use of arms which are initially very good for the buyer
(giving the item away for free, accumulating negative regret), followed by a period where they are
very bad for the buyer (where they pay more than their value). The trick in the construction is
making sure that the good/bad intervals line up so that: a) the buyer purchases the item in every
round, no matter their value (this is necessary in order to possibly extract full welfare) and b) by
round T , the buyer has zero (arbitrarily small) utility, no matter their value.
Getting the intervals to line up properly so that any mean-based learner will pick the desired
arms still requires some work. But interestingly, our constructed mechanism is non-adaptive and
prior-independent (i.e. the same mechanism extracts full welfare for all D). Theorem 3.1 below
formally states the guarantees. The construction itself and the proof appear in Appendix B.
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Theorem 3.1. If the buyer is running a mean-based algorithm, for any constant ε > 0, there exists
a strategy for the seller which obtains revenue at least (1− ε)Val(D)T − o(T ).
Two properties should jump out as key in enabling the result above. The first is that the buyer
only has no regret towards fixed arms and not towards the policy they would have used with a lower
value (this is what leads the buyer to continue bidding 1 with value 1/2 even though they have
already learned to bid 0 with value 1/4). This suggests an avenue towards an improved learning
algorithm: have the bidder attempt to have no regret not only towards each fixed arm, but also
towards the policy of play produced when having different values. This turns out to be exactly the
right idea, and is discussed in the following subsection below.
The second key property is that we were able to “lure” the bidders into playing an arm with a
free item, then overcharge them later to make up for lost revenue. This requires that the bidder
consider pulling an arm with maximum bid exceeding their value, which will never happen in a
critical auction with clever bidders. It turns out it is still possible to do better than the default
strategy with a critical auction against clever bidders, but not as well as with an arbitrary auction.
Section 3.3 explores critical auctions for this example.
3.2 Better Learning and Arbitrary Auctions
In our bad example above, the buyer with value 1/2 for the item slowly spends the second half
of the game losing utility. While his behaviour is still no-regret (he ends up with zero net utility,
which indeed is at least as good as only bidding 0), he would have been much happier to follow the
actions of the buyer with value 1/4, who started bidding 0 at 2T/3.
Using this idea, we show how to construct a no-regret algorithm for the buyer such that the seller
receives at most the Myerson revenue every round. We accomplish this by extending an arbitrary
no-regret algorithm (e.g. EXP3) by introducing “virtual arms” for each value, so that each buyer
with value v has low regret not just with respect to every fixed bid, but also no-regret with respect
to the policy of play as if they had a different value v′ for the item (for all v′ < v). In some
ways, our construction is very similar to the construction of low internal-regret (or swap-regret)
algorithms from low external-regret algorithms. The main difference is that instead of having low
regret with respect to swapping actions, we have low regret with respect to swapping contexts (i.e.
values). Theorem 3.2 below states that the seller cannot outperform the default strategy against
buyers who use such algorithms to learn.
Theorem 3.2. There exists a no-regret algorithm for the buyer against which every seller strategy
extracts no more than Mye(D)T +O(m√δT ) revenue.
The algorithm’s description and proof appear in Appendix A. The key observation in the proof
is that “not regretting playing as if my value were v′” sounds a lot like “not preferring to report
value v′ instead of v.” This suggests that the aggregate allocation probabilities and prices paid by
any buyer using our algorithm should satisfy the same constraints as a truthful auction, proving
that the resulting revenue cannot exceed the default strategy (and indeed the proof follows this
approach).
3.3 Mean-Based Learning and Critical Auctions
Recall in our example that to extract revenue T/3, bidders with values 1/4 and 1/2 had to consider
bidding 1. If the seller is using a critical auction, overbidding is dominated, so there is no reason
for bidders to do this. In fact, the analysis and results of this section hold as long as the bidders
never consider overbidding (even if the auction isn’t critical).
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Although the auction in Section 3.1 is no longer viable, consider the following auction instead:
in addition to the zero arm, the bidder can bid 1/4 or 1/2. If they bid 1/2 in any round, they will
get the item with probability 1 and pay 1/2. If they bid 1/4 in round t ≤ T/3, they get nothing.
If they bid 1/4 in round t ∈ (T/3, T ], they get the item and pay 1/4. Let’s again see what the
bidder will choose to do, remembering that they will always pull the arm that has provided highest
cumulative utility (due to being mean-based).
Clearly, the bidder with value 1/4 will bid 1/4 every round (since they are clever, they won’t
even consider bidding 1/2), making a total payment of 2T/3 · 1/4 · 1/2 = T/12. The bidder with
value 1/2 will bid 1/2 for the first T/3 rounds, and then immediately switch to bidding 1/4, making
a total payment of T/3 · 1/2 · 1/4 + 2T/3 · 1/4 · 1/4 = T/12.
The bidder with value 1 will actually bid 1/2 for the entire T rounds. To see this, observe that
their cumulative surplus through round t from bidding 1/2 is t · 1/2 · 1/4 = t/8 (t rounds by utility
1/2 per round by probability 1/4 of having value 1). Their cumulative surplus through round t
from bidding 1/4 is instead (t − T/3) · 3/4 · 1/4 = 3t/16 − T/16 ≤ t/8 (for t ≤ T ). Because they
are mean-based, they will indeed bid 1/2 for the entire duration due to its strictly higher utility.
So their total payment will be T · 1/2 · 1/4 = T/8. The total revenue is then 7T/24 > T/4, again
surpassing the default strategy (but not reaching the T/3 achieved by our non-critical auction).
Let’s again see where our extra revenue comes from in comparison to a truthful auction. Notice
that the bidder receives the item with probability 1 conditioned on having value 1/2, and also
conditioned on having value 1. Yet somehow the bidder pays an average of 1/3 conditioned on
having value 1/2, but an average of 1/2 conditioned on having value 1. This could never happen in
a truthful auction, as the bidder would strictly prefer to pretend their value was 1/2 rather than 1.
But it is entirely possible when the buyer does mean-based learning, as evidenced by this example.
In Appendix C, we define MBRev(D) as the value of the LP in Figure 1. In Theorems 3.4 and
3.3, we show that MBRev(D)T tightly characterizes (up to ±o(T )) the optimal revenue a seller
can extract with a critical auction against a clever buyer. We state the theorem statements more
generally to remind the reader that they hold as long as the buyer never overbids (even if the
auction is arbitrary). The proofs can be found in Appendix C.1.
maximize
m∑
i=1
qi(vixi − ui)
subject to ui ≥ (vi − vj) · xj , ∀ i, j ∈ [m] : i > j
ui ≥ 0, 1 ≥ xi ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ [m]
Figure 1: The mean-based revenue LP.
Before stating our theorems, let’s parse this LP. qi is a constant representing the probability
that the buyer has value vi (also a constant). xi is a variable representing the average probability
that the bidder gets the item with value vi, and ui is a variable representing the average utility
of the bidder when having value vi. Therefore, this bidder’s average value is vixi, the average
price they pay is vixi − ui, and the objective function is simply the average revenue. The second
constraints are just normalization, ensuring that everything lies in [0, 1]. The first line of constraints
are the interesting ones. These look a lot like IC constraints that a truthful auction must satisfy,
but something’s missing: the LHS is clearly the utility of the buyer with value vi for “telling the
truth,” but the utility of the buyer for “reporting vj instead” is (vi − vj) · xj + uj . So the uj term
is missing on the RHS.
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Let’s also see a very brief proof outline for why no seller can extract more revenue than
MBRev(D):
1. Because the buyer has no regret conditioned on having value vi, their utility is at least as
high as playing arm j every round.
2. Because the auction never charges arm j more than vj (conditioned on awarding the item),
the buyer’s utility for playing arm j every round is at least yj · (vi − vj), where yj is the
average probability that arm j awards the item.
3. Because the auction is monotone, and the buyer never considers overbidding, if the buyer
gets the item with probability xj conditioned on having value vj , we must have yj ≥ xj .
These three facts together show that no seller can extract more than MBRev(D) against a no-
regret buyer who doesn’t overbid. Observe also that step 3 is exactly the step that doesn’t hold
for buyers who consider overbidding (and is exactly what’s violated in our example in Section 3.1):
if the buyer ever overbids, then they might receive the item with higher probability than had they
just played their own arm every round.
Theorem 3.3. Any strategy for the seller achieves revenue at most MBRev(D)T + o(T ) against a
buyer running a no-regret algorithm who overbids with probability 0.
Theorem 3.4. For any constant ε > 0, there exists a strategy for the seller gets revenue at
least (MBRev(D)− ε)T − o(T ) against a buyer running a mean-based algorithm who overbids with
probability 0. The strategy sets a decreasing cutoff rt and for all t awards the item with probability
1 to any bid bt ≥ rt for price bt, and with probability 0 to any bid bt < rt.
Theorem 3.5. For distributions D supported on [1/H, 1], MBRev(D) = O(log logH), and there
exist D supported on [1/H, 1] such that MBRev(D) = Θ(log logH). For this same D, MBRev(D) =
Θ(logH).4
3.4 A Final Note on the Example
While reading through our examples, the reader may think that the mean-based learner’s behavior
is clearly irrational: why would you continue paying above your value? Why would you continue
paying more than necessary, when you can safely get the item for less?
But this is exactly the point: a more thoughtful learner can indeed do better (for instance, by
using the algorithm of Section 3.2). It is also perhaps misleading to believe that the bidder should
“obviously” stop overpaying: we only know this because we know the structure of the example.
But in principle, how is the bidder supposed to know that the overcharged rounds are the new
norm and not an anomaly? Given that most standard no-regret algorithms are mean-based, it’s
important to nail down the seller’s options for exploiting this behavior.
4 Conclusion and Future Directions
Motivated by the prevalence of bidders no-regret learning to play non-truthful auctions in prac-
tice [NST15], we consider a revenue-maximizing seller with a single item (each round) to sell to
a single buyer. We show that when the buyer uses mean-based algorithms like EXP3, the seller
can extract revenue equal to the expected welfare with an unnatural auction. We then provide a
4The promised D is the equal-revenue curve truncated at H .
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modified no-regret algorithm A such that the seller cannot extract revenue exceeding the monopoly
revenue when the buyer bids according to A. Finally, we consider a mean-based buyer who never
overbids. We tightly characterize the seller’s optimal revenue with a linear program, and show that
a pay-your-bid auction with decreasing reserves over time achieves this guarantee. Moreover, we
show that the mean-based revenue can be unboundedly better than the monopoly revenue while
simultaneously worse than the expected welfare. In particular, for the equal revenue curve trun-
cated at H, the monopoly revenue is 1, the expected welfare is ln(H), and the mean-based revenue
is Θ(ln(ln(H))).
While our work has already shown the single-buyer problem is quite interesting, the most natural
direction for future work is understanding revenue maximization with multiple learning buyers. Of
our three main results, only Theorem 3.2 extends easily (that if every buyer uses our modified
learning, the default strategy, which now runs Myerson’s optimal auction every round, is optimal;
see Theorem A.5 for details). Our work certainly provides good insight into the multi-bidder
problem, but there are still clear barriers. For example, in order to obtain revenue equal to the
expected welfare, the auction must necessarily also maximize welfare. In our single-bidder model,
this means that we can give away the item for free for Ω(T ) rounds, but with multiple bidders, such
careless behaviour would immediately make it impossible to achieve the optimal welfare. Regarding
the mean-based revenue, while there is a natural generalization of our LP to multiple bidders, it’s
no longer clear how to achieve this revenue with a critical auction, as all the relevant variables now
implicitly depend on the actions of the other bidders. These are just examples of concrete barriers,
and there are likely interesting conceptual barriers for this extension as well.
Another interesting direction is understanding the consequences of our work from the perspec-
tive of the buyer. Aside from certain corner configurations (e.g. the seller extracting the buyer’s
full welfare), it’s not obvious how the buyer’s utility changes. For instance, is it possible that the
buyer’s utility actually increases as the seller switches from the default strategy to the optimal
mean-based revenue? Does the buyer ever benefit from using an “exploitable” learning strategy, so
that the seller can exploit it and make them both happier?
References
[ACBFS03] Peter Auer, Nicolo` Cesa-Bianchi, Yoav Freund, and Robert E. Schapire. The non-
stochastic multiarmed bandit problem. SIAM J. Comput., 32(1):48–77, January 2003.
[ADH16] Itai Ashlagi, Constantinos Daskalakis, and Nima Haghpanah. Sequential mechanisms
with ex-post participation guarantees. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on
Economics and Computation, EC ’16, Maastricht, The Netherlands, July 24-28, 2016,
pages 213–214, 2016.
[AHK12] Sanjeev Arora, Elad Hazan, and Satyen Kale. The multiplicative weights update
method: a meta-algorithm and applications. Theory of Computing, 8(6):121–164, 2012.
[BC12] Se´bastien Bubeck and Nicolo` Cesa-Bianchi. Regret analysis of stochastic and non-
stochastic multi-armed bandit problems. Foundations and Trends in Machine Learn-
ing, 5(1):1–122, 2012.
[BM07] Avrim Blum and Yishay Mansour. From external to internal regret. Journal of Machine
Learning Research, 8:1307–1324, 2007.
[CD17] Yang Cai and Constantinos Daskalakis. Learning multi-item auctions with (or without)
samples. In FOCS, 2017.
11
[Cla71] Edward H. Clarke. Multipart Pricing of Public Goods. Public Choice, 11(1):17–33,
1971.
[CR14] Richard Cole and Tim Roughgarden. The sample complexity of revenue maximization.
In Proceedings of the Forty-sixth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
STOC ’14, pages 243–252, New York, NY, USA, 2014. ACM.
[DHL+17] Miroslav Dud´ık, Nika Haghtalab, Haipeng Luo, Robert E. Schapire, Vasilis Syrgkanis,
and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. Oracle-efficient learning and auction design. In FOCS,
2017.
[DHP16] Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang, and Christos-Alexandros Psomas. The sample com-
plexity of auctions with side information. In Proceedings of the Forty-eighth Annual
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC ’16, pages 426–439, New York, NY,
USA, 2016. ACM.
[DPS15] Nikhil R. Devanur, Yuval Peres, and Balasubramanian Sivan. Perfect bayesian equi-
libria in repeated sales. In Proceedings of the Twenty-sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Sym-
posium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA ’15, pages 983–1002, Philadelphia, PA, USA,
2015. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
[DS16] Constantinos Daskalakis and Vasilis Syrgkanis. Learning in auctions: Regret is hard,
envy is easy. In IEEE 57th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science,
FOCS 2016, 9-11 October 2016, Hyatt Regency, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA,
pages 219–228, 2016.
[DW12] Constantinos Daskalakis and S. Matthew Weinberg. Symmetries and Optimal Multi-
Dimensional Mechanism Design. In the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
(EC), 2012.
[GN17] Yannai A. Gonczarowski and Noam Nisan. Efficient empirical revenue maximization
in single-parameter auction environments. In Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM
SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2017, pages 856–868, New York,
NY, USA, 2017. ACM.
[Gro73] Theodore Groves. Incentives in Teams. Econometrica, 41(4):617–631, 1973.
[Han57] James Hannan. Approximation to bayes risk in repeated play. In Contributions to the
Theory of Games, pages 3:97–139, 1957.
[ILPT17] Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Emmanouil Pountourakis, and Samuel Taggart.
Repeated sales with multiple strategic buyers. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Con-
ference on Economics and Computation, pages 167–168. ACM, 2017.
[KV02] Adam Kalai and Santosh Vempala. Geometric algorithms for online optimization. In
Journal of Computer and System Sciences, pages 26–40, 2002.
[KV05] Adam Kalai and Santosh Vempala. Efficient algorithms for online decision problems.
J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 71(3):291–307, October 2005.
[LP17] Siqi Liu and Christos-Alexandros Psomas. On the competition complexity of dynamic
mechanism design. CoRR, abs/1709.07955, 2017.
12
[LZ08] John Langford and Tong Zhang. The epoch-greedy algorithm for multi-armed bandits
with side information. In J. C. Platt, D. Koller, Y. Singer, and S. T. Roweis, edi-
tors, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 20, pages 817–824. Curran
Associates, Inc., 2008.
[MLTZ16a] Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang, and Song Zuo. Dynamic
auctions with bank accounts. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2016, New York, NY, USA, 9-15 July
2016, pages 387–393, 2016.
[MLTZ16b] Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang, and Song Zuo. Optimal
dynamic mechanisms with ex-post IR via bank accounts. CoRR, abs/1605.08840, 2016.
[MR15] Jamie Morgenstern and Tim Roughgarden. The pseudo-dimension of near-optimal
auctions. In Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Neural Information
Processing Systems - Volume 1, NIPS’15, pages 136–144, Cambridge, MA, USA, 2015.
MIT Press.
[MR16] Jamie Morgenstern and Tim Roughgarden. Learning simple auctions. In Vitaly Feld-
man, Alexander Rakhlin, and Ohad Shamir, editors, 29th Annual Conference on Learn-
ing Theory, volume 49 of Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, pages 1298–1318,
Columbia University, New York, New York, USA, 23–26 Jun 2016. PMLR.
[Mye81] Roger B. Myerson. Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operations Research,
6(1):58–73, 1981.
[NST15] Denis Nekipelov, Vasilis Syrgkanis, and Eva Tardos. Econometrics for learning agents.
In Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC
’15, pages 1–18, New York, NY, USA, 2015. ACM.
[PPPR16] Christos Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, and Aviad
Rubinstein. On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design. In Proceedings of the
Twenty-seventh Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA ’16,
pages 1458–1475, Philadelphia, PA, USA, 2016. Society for Industrial and Applied
Mathematics.
[Rou12] Tim Roughgarden. The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information. In
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC ’12, pages 862–
879, New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM.
[ST13] Vasilis Syrgkanis and Eva Tardos. Composable and efficient mechanisms. In Proceedings
of the Forty-fifth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC ’13, pages
211–220, New York, NY, USA, 2013. ACM.
[Vic61] William Vickrey. Counterspeculations, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders.
Journal of Finance, 16(1):8–37, 1961.
A Good no-regret algorithms for the buyer
In this section we show that there exists a (contextual) no-regret algorithm for the buyer which
guarantees that the seller receives at most the Myerson revenue per round (i.e., Mye(D)T in total).
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As mentioned earlier, it does not suffice for the buyer to simply run the contextualization cont(M)
for some no-regret learning algorithm M (and in fact, if M is mean-based, the seller can extract
strictly more than Mye(D)T , as we will see later). However, by modifying cont(M) so that it has
not just no-regret with respect to the best stationary policy, but so that it additionally does not
regret playing as if it had some other context, we obtain a no-regret algorithm for the buyer which
guarantees the seller receives no more than Mye(D) per round.
The details of the algorithm are presented in Algorithm 1. Recall that the distribution D is
supported over m values v1 < v2 < · · · < vm, where for each i ∈ [m], vi has probability qi under
D. The algorithm takes a no-regret algorithm M for the classic multi-armed bandit problem, and
runs M instances of it, one per possible value u. Each instance Mi of M learns not only over the
possible K actions, but also over i − 1 virtual actions corresponding to values v1 through vi−1.
Picking the virtual action associated with vj corresponds to the buyer pretending they have value
vj , and playing accordingly (i.e., querying Mj).
This algorithm is very similar in structure to the construction of a low swap-regret bandits
algorithm from a generic no-regret bandits algorithm (see [BM07]). The main difference is that
whereas swap regret guarantees no-regret with respect to swapping actions (i.e. always playing
action i instead of action j), this algorithm guarantees no-regret with respect to swapping contexts
(i.e., always pretending you have context i when you actually have context j). In addition, the
auction structure of our problem allows us to only consider contexts with valuations smaller than
our current valuation vi; this puts a limit of m on the number of recursive calls per round, as
opposed to the low swap regret algorithm where one must solve for the stationary distribution of a
Markov chain over m states each round.
Algorithm 1 No-regret algorithm for buyer.
1: Let M be a δ-no-regret algorithm for the classic multi-armed bandit problem, with δ = o(T ).
Initialize m copies of M , M1 through Mm.
2: Instance Mi of M will learn over K + i− 1 arms.
3: The first K arms of Mi (“bid arms”) correspond to the K possible menu options b1, b2, . . . , bK .
4: The last i − 1 arms of Mi (“value arms”) correspond to the i − 1 possible values (contexts)
v1, . . . , vi−1.
5: for t = 1 to T do
6: if buyer has value vi then
7: Use Mi to pick one arm from the K + i− 1 arms.
8: if the arm is a bid arm bj then
9: Pick the menu option j (i.e. bid bj).
10: else if the arm is a value arm vj then
11: Sample an arm from Mj (but don’t update its state). If it is a bid arm, pick the
corresponding menu option. If it is a value arm, recurse.
12: end if
13: Update the state of algorithm Mi with the utility of this round.
14: end if
15: end for
We now proceed to show that Algorithm 1 has our desired guarantees.
Theorem A.1. Let qmin = mini qi. If the buyer plays according to Algorithm 1 then the seller
(even if they play an adaptive strategy) receives no more than Mye(D)T + mδqmin revenue.
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Proof. For each i ∈ [m], define hi to be the expected number of rounds the buyer receives the item
when they have value vi. For each i ∈ [m] define ri to be the expected total payment from the
buyer to the seller when the buyer has value vi. Our goal is to upper bound
∑
i ri, the total revenue
the seller receives.
Recall that every strategy must contain a zero option in its menu, where the buyer pays nothing
and doesn’t receive the item (and hence receives zero utility). Since each Mi is a δ-no-regret
algorithm, we know that the buyer does not regret always choosing the zero option when they have
value vi. It follows that, for all i ∈ [m], we have that
vihi − ri ≥ −δ. (1)
The following lemma shows that when j > i, the buyer does not regret pretending to have value
vi when they have value vj.
Lemma A.2. For all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m,
(vjhj − rj)/qj ≥ (vjhi − ri)/qi − δ/qj .
Proof. From the algorithm, we know that Mj does not regret always playing the value arm cor-
responding to vi. We define the following notation. For all i ∈ [m], t ∈ [T ] and any history π of
t− 1 rounds (including for each round which option is chosen and the utility of that round), define
hi(t, π) to be the probability of getting item in round t given history π when buyer has value vi and
define ri(t, π) to be the expected price paid in round t when the buyer has value vi given history π.
Let Πt be the distribution of histories at round t, for t = 0, ..., T − 1. The no-regret guarantee
tells us that
T∑
t=1
qj · Eπ∼Πt−1 [(hj(t, π)vj − rj(t, π)) − (hi(t, π)vj − ri(t, π))] ≥ −δ. (2)
Note that
T∑
t=1
Eπ∼Πt−1[hj(t, π)qj ] = hj,
T∑
t=1
Eπ∼Πt−1 [hi(t, π)qi] = hi,
T∑
t=1
Eπ∼Πt−1 [rj(t, π)qj ] = rj,
T∑
t=1
Eπ∼Πt−1[ri(t, π)qi] = ri.
Dividing (2) through by qj and substituting in these relations, we arrive at the statement of the
lemma.
Now define λi =
∑
j≤i
1
qj
, and define
r′i =
ri
qi
− λiδ. (3)
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It follows from Lemma A.2 that for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m,
vjhj
qj
− r′j ≥
vjhi
qi
− r′i. (4)
From (1), we also have for all i ∈ [m],
vihi
qj
− r′i ≥ 0. (5)
We will argue from these constraints that
∑
i qir
′
i ≤ Mye(D)T . To do this, we will construct
a single-round mechanism for selling an item to a buyer with value distribution D such that this
mechanism has expected revenue
∑
i qir
′
i/T ; the result then follows from the optimality of the
Myerson mechanism ([Mye81]).
To construct this mechanism, first find a sequence of indices a1, a2, . . . , al via the following
algorithm.
1: l← 1, a1 ← 1.
2: for i = 2 to m do
3: if r′ai ≥ r′al then
4: l ← l + 1, al ← i.
5: end if
6: end for
It is easy to verify that following this algorithm results in r′a1 ≤ r′a2 ≤ · · · ≤ r′al . For any
ai ≤ j < ai+1 (assuming al+1 = m+ 1), r′j < r′ai .
Lemma A.3. For a bidder with value distribution D, the following menu of l options will achieve
revenue at least
∑m
i=1 r
′
iqi/T : for each 1 ≤ i ≤ l, the buyer has the choice of paying r′ai/T , and
receiving the item with probability hai/(qaiT ).
Proof. Consider some value vj in D. We will show that the buyer with value vj will pay at least
r′j/T , thus proving the lemma. Assume ai ≤ j ≤ ai+1.
We have (from (5) and the monotonicity of vi) that
vjhai
qai
− r′ai ≥
vaihai
qai
− r′ai ≥ 0.
This means the buyer with value uj receives non-negative utility by choosing option i. For any
1 ≤ i′ < i, we have (from (4)) that
vaihai
qai
− r′ai ≥
vaihai′
qai′
− r′ai′ .
Since r′ai ≥ r′ai′ , the above inequality implies that
hai
qai
≥ hai′
qai′
.
It follows that
vj
(
hai
qai
− hai′
qai′
)
≥ vai
(
hai
qai
− hai′
qai′
)
≥ r′ai − r′ai′ .
This means the buyer with value vj prefers option i to all options i
′ < i. Therefore this buyer will
choose an option from {i, i + 1, . . . , l}. Since r′j ≤ r′ai ≤ r′ai+1 ≤ · · · ≤ r′al , we know that this buyer
will pay at least r′j/T , as desired.
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It follows from the optimality of the Myerson auction that
∑
i qir
′
i/T ≤ Mye(D), and therefore
that
∑
i qir
′
i ≤ Mye(D)T . Expanding out r′i via (3), we have that
∑
i
qir
′
i =
∑
i
ri −
∑
i
qiλiδ
≥
∑
i
ri − δ ·max
i
λi
≥
∑
i
ri − mδ
qmin
,
from which the theorem follows.
We can remove the explicit dependence on qmin by filtering out all values which occur with
small enough probability.
Corollary A.4 (Restatement of Theorem 3.2). There exists a no-regret algorithm for the buyer
where the seller receives no more than Mye(D)T +O(m√δT ) revenue.
Proof. Ignore all values vi with qi ≤
√
δ/T (whenever a round with this value arises, choose an
arbitrary action for this round). There are m total values, so this happens with at most probability
m
√
δ/T , and therefore modifies the regret and revenue in expectation by at mostO(m
√
δT ) = o(T ).
The regret bound from Theorem A.1 then holds with qmin ≥
√
δ/T , from which the result
follows.
A.1 Multiple bidders
Interestingly, we show that by slightly modifying Algorithm 1, we obtain an algorithm (Algorithm
2) that works for the case where there are multiple bidders. In the multiple bidder setting, there
are B bidders with independent valuations for the item. Each round t, bidder ℓ receives a value
vℓ(t) for the item drawn from a distribution Dℓ (independently of all other values). Each distri-
bution Dℓ is supported over mℓ values, vℓ,1 < vℓ,2 < · · · < vℓ,mℓ , where vℓ,i occurs under Dℓ with
probability qℓ,i. Every round each bidder ℓ submits a bid bℓ(t), and the auctioneer decides on an
allocation rule at, which maps ℓ-tuples of bids (b1(t), b2(t), . . . , bB(t)) to ℓ-tuples of probabilities
(a1(t), a2(t), . . . , aB(t)) and a pricing rule pt, which maps ℓ-tuples of bids (b1(t), b2(t), . . . , bB(t)) to
ℓ-tuples of prices (p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pB(t)). The allocation rule at must additionally obey the supply
constraint that
∑
ℓ aℓ(t) ≤ 1. Bidder ℓ wins the item with probability aℓ(t) and pays pℓ(t).
We show that if every bidder plays the no-regret algorithm Algorithm 2, then the auctioneer
(even if playing adaptively) is guaranteed to receive no more than Mye(D1,D2, . . . ,DB)T + o(T )
revenue, where Mye(D1,D2, . . . ,DB) is the optimal revenue obtainable by an auctioneer selling
a single item to B bidders with valuations drawn independently from distributions Dℓ. In other
words, if every bidder plays according to Algorithm 2, the seller can do nothing better than running
the single-round optimal Myerson auction every round.
The only difference between Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 is that instance Mi in Algorithm 2
has a value arm for every possible value, not only the values less than vi. This means that the
recursion depth of this algorithm is potentially unlimited, however it will still terminate in finite
expected time since we insist that M has a positive probability of picking any arm (in particular,
it will eventually pick a bid arm). We can optimize the runtime of step 11 of Algorithm 2 by
eliciting a probability distribution over arms from each instance Mi, constructing a Markov chain,
and solving for the stationary distribution. This takes O((K+m)3) time per step of this algorithm.
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Algorithm 2 No-regret algorithm for a bidder (when there are multiple bidders).
1: Let M be a δ-no-regret algorithm for the classic multi-armed bandit problem (that always has
some positive probability of choosing any arm), with δ = o(T ). Initialize m copies of M , M1
through Mm.
2: Instance Mi of M will learn over K +m arms.
3: The first K arms of Mi (“bid arms”) correspond to the K possible menu options b1, . . . , bK .
4: The lastm arms ofMi (“value arms”) correspond to them possible values (contexts) v1, . . . , vm.
5: for t = 1 to T do
6: if buyer has value vi then
7: Use Mi to pick one arm from the K +m arms.
8: if the arm is a bid arm bj then
9: Pick the menu option j (i.e. bid bj).
10: else if the arm is a value arm vj then
11: Sample an arm from Mj (but don’t update its state). If it is a bid arm, pick the
corresponding menu option. If it is a value arm, recurse.
12: end if
13: Update the state of algorithm Mi with the utility of this round.
14: end if
15: end for
Theorem A.5. Let qmin = minℓ,i qℓ,i. If every bidder plays according to Algorithm 2 then the
auctioneer (even if they play an adaptive strategy) receives no more than Mye(D1,D2, . . . ,DB)T +
O
(√
δT
qmin
)
revenue.
Proof. Similarly as before, let hℓ,i equal the expected number of rounds bidder ℓ receives the item
while having value vℓ,i, and let rℓ,i equal the expected total amount bidder ℓ pays to the auctioneer
while having value vℓ,i. Again, our goal is to upper bound
∑
ℓ
∑
i rℓ,i, the total expected revenue
the seller receives.
Note that, as before, since every strategy contains a zero option in its menu, we have that (for
all ℓ ∈ [B] and i ∈ [mℓ])
vℓ,ihℓ,i − rℓ,i ≥ −δ. (6)
Repeating the argument of Lemma A.2 (which still holds in the multiple bidder setting), we addi-
tionally have that (for all ℓ ∈ [B] and 1 ≤ i < j ≤ mℓ),
vℓ,jhℓ,j − rℓ,j
qℓ,j
≥ vℓ,jhℓ,i − rℓ,i
qℓ,i
− δ
qℓ,j
. (7)
We will now (as in the proof of Theorem A.1) construct a mechanism for the single-round
instance of the problem of an auctioneer selling a single item to B bidders with valuations inde-
pendently drawn from Dℓ. Our mechanism M will work as follows:
1. The auctioneer will begin by asking each of the bidders for their valuations. Assume that
bidder ℓ reports valuation v′ℓ (we will insist that v
′
ℓ belongs to the support of Dℓ).
2. The auctioneer will then sample a t ∈ [T ] uniformly at random.
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3. For each bidder ℓ, the auctioneer will calculate aℓ(t) and pℓ(t), the expected allocation proba-
bility and price bidder ℓ has to pay in round t of the dynamic T -round mechanism, conditioned
on vℓ(t) = v
′
ℓ for all ℓ.
4. The auctioneer will then give the item to bidder ℓ with probability aℓ(t), and charge bidder
ℓ a price pℓ(t).
Note that since the allocation rules at must always satisfy the supply constraint, the probabilities
aℓ(t) we sample also obey this supply constraint, and therefore this is a valid mechanism for the
single-round problem. We will now show it is approximately incentive compatible.
Lemma A.6. Mechanism M is δqminT -Bayesian incentive compatible and
δ
qminT
-ex-interim indi-
vidually rational.
Proof. To begin, we claim that in expectation, if bidder ℓ reports valuation vℓ,i (and everyone else
reports truthfully), then the expected probability bidder ℓ receives the item (under this single-round
mechanism) is equal to hℓ,i/Tqℓ,i. Likewise, we claim that, if bidder ℓ reports valuation vℓ,i (and
everyone else reports truthfully), the expected payment bidder they pay is equal to rℓ,i/Tqℓ,i.
To see why this is true, let hℓ(t, i1, i2, . . . , iB) equal the probability bidder ℓ gets the item (in
the multi-round mechanism) at time t conditioned on vℓ(t) = vℓ,i for all ℓ ∈ [B]. By construction,
the probability a′ℓ,i bidder ℓ receives the item (in mechanism M) after reporting valuation vℓ,i is
equal to
a′ℓ,i =
1
T
∑
t
∑
ℓ′ 6=ℓ,vℓ′,i
ℓ′
∈suppDℓ′
∏
ℓ′ 6=ℓ
qℓ′,iℓ′hℓ(t, i1, i2, . . . , iℓ−1, i, iℓ+1, . . . , iB).
On the other hand, we can write hℓ,i in terms of our function hℓ a
hℓ,i =
∑
t
∑
ℓ′ 6=ℓ,vℓ′,iℓ′∈suppDℓ′
qℓ,i
∏
ℓ′ 6=ℓ
qℓ′,iℓ′hℓ(t, i1, i2, . . . , iℓ−1, i, iℓ+1, . . . , iB).
It follows that a′ℓ,i =
hℓ,i
Tqℓ,i
. A similar calculation shows that if p′ℓ,i is the expected payment of
bidder ℓ (if they report valuation vℓ,i and everyone else reports truthfully), then p
′
ℓ,i =
rℓ,i
Tqℓ,i
.
Now, recall that a mechanism is ǫ-BIC if misreporting your value increases your expected utility
by at most ǫ (assuming everyone else reports truthfully). To show that mechanism M is ǫ-BIC, it
therefore suffices to show that for all j 6= i, that
a′ℓ,jvℓ,i − p′ℓ,j ≤ a′ℓ,ivℓ,i − p′ℓ,i + ǫ.
But for ǫ = δ/(qminT ), this follows from equation (7). Similarly, M is ǫ-ex-interim IR if for all
i,
a′ℓ,ivℓ,i − p′ℓ,i ≥ −ǫ.
Again, this follows from equation (6), and the result therefore follows.
We now apply the following lemma from [DW12], which lets us transform an ǫ-BIC mechanism
M into a BIC mechanism M ′ at the cost of O(
√
ε) revenue.
Lemma A.7. If M is an ǫ-BIC, ǫ-ex-interim IR mechanism for selling a single item to several
bidders with independent valuations, then there exists a BIC, ex-interim IR mechanism M ′ for the
same problem that satisfies Rev(M ′) ≥ Rev(M)−O(√ǫ).
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Proof. See Theorem 3.3 in [DW12].
Applying Lemma A.7 to our mechanism, we obtain a mechanism M ′ that satisfies Rev(M ′) ≥
Rev(M) − O(
√
δ
qminT
). Finally, note that since the Myerson auction is the optimal Bayesian-
incentive compatible mechanism for this problem, Rev(M ′) ≤ Mye(D1, . . . ,DB). On the other
hand, since (from the proof of Lemma A.6) the expected payment bidder ℓ pays under mechanism
M when being truthful is equal to:
∑
i
qℓ,i · rℓ,i
Tqℓ,i
=
1
T
∑
i
rℓ,i.
It follows that
1
T
∑
ℓ
∑
i
rℓ,i ≤ Mye(D1, . . . ,DB) +O(
√
δ
qminT
),
and thus that
∑
ℓ
∑
i
rℓ,i ≤ Mye(D1, . . . ,DB)T +O(
√
δT
qmin
).
B Achieving full welfare against non-conservative buyers
In this section, we will show that if the buyer uses a mean-based algorithm instead of Algorithm 1,
the seller has a strategy which extracts the entire welfare from the buyer (hence leaving the buyer
with zero utility).
Theorem B.1 (Restatement of Theorem 3.1). If the buyer is non-conservative and running a
mean-based algorithm, for any constant ε > 0, there exists a strategy for the seller which obtains
revenue at least (1− ε)Val(D)T − o(T ).
Proof. If every element in the support of D is at least 1− ε, then the seller can simply always sell
the item at price 1− ε (since D is supported on [0, 1], this ensures a (1 − ε) approximation to the
buyer’s welfare). From now on, we will assume that D is not entirely supported on [1− ε, 1].
Recall that D is supported on m values v1 < v2 < · · · < vm, where vi is chosen with probability
qi. Define ρ = min(vm, 1− ε/2), and define δ = (1 − ρ)/(1 − v1). Since v1 < 1− ε/2 and v1 < vm,
we know that v1 < ρ and therefore δ < 1. Notice that here we can make the strategy independent
of D if we just pick ρ = 1 − ε/2 and δ = ε/2 (but setting ρ and δ according to information about
D can reduce the number of arms).
Consider the following strategy for the seller. In addition to the zero arm, the seller will offer
n = log(ε/2)log(1−δ) possible options, each with maximum bid value bi = 1. We divide the timeline of each
arm into three “sessions” in the following way:
1. ∅ session: For the first (1 − (1 − δ)i−1)T rounds, the seller charges 0 and does not give the
item to the buyer (i.e. (pi,t, qi,t) = (0, 0)).
2. 0 session: For the next (1− δ)i−1(1− ρ)T rounds, the seller charges 0 and gives the item to
the buyer (i.e. (pi,t, qi,t) = (0, 1)).
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3. 1 session: For the final (1 − δ)i−1ρT rounds, the seller charges 1 and gives the item to the
buyer (i.e. (pi,t, qi,t) = (1, 1)).
Note that this strategy is monotone; if i > j, then pi,t ≥ pj,t and ai,t ≥ aj,t.
Assume that the buyer is running a γ-mean-based algorithm, for some γ = o(1). Define Aj =
(1−ρ(1−δ)j−1)T and Bj(v) = Aj+min(v,ρ)1−v1 (1−ρ)(1−δ)j−1T−γT . Note that Aj is the round where
arm j starts its 1 session; we show in the following Lemma that (by the mean-based property), the
buyer with value v will prefer arm j over any arm j′ < j over all rounds in the interval [Aj , Bj(v)].
Lemma B.2. For each vi ∈ D, j ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}, and round τ ∈ [Aj , Bj(vi)], σj,τ (vi) > σj′,τ (vi)+
γT for all j′ > j.
Proof. Note that arm j starts its 1 session at round Aj ≤ τ . It follows that
σj,τ (vi) = vi
(
τ − (1− (1− δ)j−1)T )− ((1− δ)j−1Tρ− (T − τ))
= (T − τ) + (vi − ρ)(1− δ)j−1T + viτ − Tvi.
Now consider the cumulative utility of playing some arm j′ > j. It is easy to verify that
Bj < Aj+1, and therefore arm j
′ is still either in its ∅ session or its 0 session. Since arm j+1 starts
its 0 session the earliest, it follows that σj′,τ (vi) ≤ σj+1,τ (vi), so from now on, assume without loss
of generality that j′ = j + 1. There are two cases:
1. If τ < T (1− (1− δ)j), the utility is 0.
2. If τ ≥ T (1− (1− δ)j), the utility is (τ − T (1− (1− δ)j))vi.
It suffices to show that
(T − τ) + (vi − ρ)(1− δ)j−1T + viτ − Tvi ≥ max(0, (τ − T (1− (1− δ)j))vi) + γT.
We have that
(T − τ) + (vi − ρ)(1− δ)j−1T + viτ − Tvi − (τ − T (1− (1− δ)j))vi
= vi(1− δ)j−1δT + (T − τ)− ρ(1− δ)j−1T
≥ vi(1− δ)j−1δT + (T −Bj(vi))− ρ(1− δ)j−1T
= (1− δ)j−1T
(
viδ − (1− ρ)min(vi, ρ)
1− v1
)
+ γT
= (1− δ)j−1T (1− ρ)
(
vi −min(vi, ρ)
1− v1
)
+ γT
≥ γT.
Similarly
(T − τ) + (vi − ρ)(1 − δ)j−1T + viτ − Tvi
≥ T −Bj(vi) + (vi − ρ)(1 − δ)j−1T + viBj(vi)− Tvi
= (Bj(vi)− T (1− (1− δ)j−1))vi + (T −Bj(vi)− ρ(1− δ)j−1T )
= (Bj(vi)− T (1− (1− δ)j−1))vi −min(vi, ρ)δ(1 − δ)j−1T + γT
≥ (Bj(vi)− T (1− (1− δ)j−1))vi − viδ(1 − δ)j−1T + γT
≥ (Bj(vi)− T (1− (1− δ)j))vi + γT
≥ γT.
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It follows from the mean-based condition (Definition 2.4) that in the interval [Aj , Bj(vi)] the
buyer with value vi will, with probability at least (1−nγ), choose an arm currently in its 1-session
(i.e. an arm with label at most j) and hence pay 1 each round. Since the buyer has value vi for the
item with probability qi, the total contribution of the buyer with value vi to the expected revenue
of the seller is given by
qi
n∑
j=1
(1− γ)(Bj(vi)−Aj(vi)) = qi
n∑
j=1
(1− nγ)
(
min(u, ρ)
1− v1 (1− ρ)(1 − δ)
j−1T − γT
)
= (1− nγ)qiT

−nγ + (1− ρ)min(vi, ρ)
1− v1
n∑
j=1
(1− δ)j−1


= (1− nγ)qiT
(
−nγ + (1− ρ)min(vi, ρ)(1 − (1− δ)
n)
(1− v1)δ
)
= (1− nγ)qiT (−nγ +min(vi, ρ)(1 − (1− δ)n))
= qiT min(vi, ρ)(1 − (1− δ)n)− o(T )
≥ qiT
(
1− ε
2
)2
vi − o(T )
≥ (1− ε)qiviT − o(T ).
Here we have used the fact that (1 − (1 − δ)n) = 1 − ε/2 (since n = log(ε/2)/ log(1 − δ)) and
min(vi, ρ) ≥ (1 − ε/2)vi (since if min(vi, ρ) 6= vi, then ρ = (1 − ε/2) ≥ (1 − ε/2)vi. Summing this
contribution over all vi ∈ D, we have that the expected revenue of the seller is at least
∑
i
((1− ε)qiviT − o(T )) = (1− ε)
(∑
i
qivi
)
T − o(T )
= (1− ε)Ev∼D[v]T
= (1− ε)Val(D)T.
C Optimal revenue against conservative buyers
In Theorem 3.1, we demonstrated a mechanism for the seller that extracts full welfare from a buyer
running a mean-based learning algorithm. This mechanism, while in some sense as good as possible
(it is impossible to extract more than welfare from any buyer running a no-regret strategy), has
several drawbacks. One general drawback is that it is extremely unlikely the mechanism in Section
B would arise naturally as the allocation rule for any sort of auction that might arise in practice. A
more specific drawback is that this mechanism assumes buyers are learning over all possible bids,
instead of just bids less than their value; indeed, all arms essentially cost the maximum possible
price per round, and their only difference is when they give the item away for free and when they
charge for it.
In this section, we address the second drawback by studying this problem for conservative
buyers; buyers who are constrained to only submit bids less than their current value for the item.
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We characterize via a linear program the optimal revenue attainable for the seller when playing
against conservative buyers running a mean-based learning algorithm over their set of allowable
bids. We show that, while we can no longer achieve the full welfare as in Section B, we can still
achieve strictly more than the Myerson revenue. Interestingly, our optimal mechanism has a natural
interpretation as a repeated first-price auction with gradually decreasing reserve, thus also partially
addressing the first drawback. Notably, this auction is a critical auction. Since clever buyers act
conservatively in critical auctions, this mechanism is simultaneously the optimal critical auction
against clever buyers.
C.1 Characterizing the optimal revenue
maximize
m∑
i=1
qi(vixi − ui)
subject to ui ≥ (vi − vj) · xj , ∀ i, j ∈ [m] : i > j
ui ≥ 0, 1 ≥ xi ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ [m]
Figure 2: The mean-based revenue LP (same as Figure 1).
We begin by describing the optimal strategy for the seller against mean-based conservative
buyers. Fix some small constant ε > 0. Recall that the buyer’s value distribution D is supported
on the m values 0 ≤ v1 < v2 < · · · < vm ≤ 1, with Pr[vi] = qi. The seller will offer m options, one
for each possible value. Option i (corresponding to bidding bi = vi) will charge 0 and not allocate
the item for the first (1 − xi)T rounds, and charge bi − ε and allocate the item for the remaining
xiT rounds. The values xi are computed by finding an optimal solution to the above LP (Figure
2), which we call the mean-based revenue LP. We will call the value of this LP the mean-based
revenue of D, and write this as MBRev(D). Our goal in this subsection will be to show that this
strategy achieves approximately MBRev(D)T total revenue against a conservative buyer running a
mean-based algorithm, and that this is tight; no other strategy for a non-adaptive seller can obtain
more than MBRev(D)T revenue.
To show that this is a valid strategy for the seller, we need to show that the values xi are
monotone increasing. Luckily, this follows simply from the structure of the mean-based revenue
LP.
Lemma C.1. Let x1, x2, . . . , xm, u1, u2, . . . , um be an optimal solution to the mean-based revenue
LP. Then for all i < j, xi < xj .
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that the sequence of xi are not monotone; then there
exists an 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 such that xi > xi+1. Now consider another solution of the LP, where we
increase xi+1 to xi, keeping the value of all other variables the same. This new solution does not
violate any constraints in the LP since for all j > i+1, uj ≥ (vj−vi) ·xi ≥ (vj−vi+1) ·xi. However
this change increases the value of the objective by vi+1qi+1(xi − xi+1) > 0, thus contradicting the
fact that x1, . . . , xm, u1, ..., um was an optimal solution of the mean-based revenue LP.
We begin by showing that this strategy achieves revenue at least MBRev(D)T − o(T ) when the
buyer is using a mean-based algorithm.
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Theorem C.2 (Restatement of Theorem 3.4). The above strategy for the seller gets revenue at
least (MBRev(D) − ε)T − o(T ) against a conservative buyer running a mean-based algorithm. In
addition, this strategy is critical.
Proof. First of all, by Lemma C.1, it is easy to check the strategy is critical.
To prove the rest, we will show that: i) the buyer with value vi receives the item for at least
xiT−o(T ) turns (receiving vixiT−o(T ) total utility from the items), and ii) this buyer’s net utility is
at most (ui+ε)T+o(T ). This implies that this buyer pays the seller at least xiviT−(ui+ε)T−o(T )
over the course of the T rounds; taking expectation over all vi completes the proof.
Assume the buyer is running a γ-mean-based learning algorithm. Consider the buyer when they
have value vi. Note that
σj,t(vi) = (vi − vj + ε) ·max(0, t− (1− xj)T ).
We first claim that after round (1 − xi)T + γT/ε, the buyer will buy the item (i.e., choose an
option that results in him getting the item) each round with probability at least 1 −mγ. To see
this, first note that σi,t(vi) ≥ γT when t ≥ (1 − xi)T + γT/ε. Then, since the cumulative utility
of any arm is 0 until it starts offering the item, it follows from the mean-based condition that the
buyer will pick a specific arm that is not offering the item with probability at most γ, and therefore
choose some good arm with probability at least 1−mγ. It follows that, in expectation, the buyer
with value vi receives the item for at least (1−mγ)(xiT − γT/ε) = xiT − o(T ) turns.
We now proceed to upper bound the overall expected utility of the buyer. For each index j ≤ i,
let Sj be the set of t where σj,t(vi) > σj′,t(vi) for all other j
′. Note that since each σj,t(vi) is a linear
function in t (when positive), each Sj is either the empty set or an interval (yjT, zjT ). Since all the
vi are distinct, note that these intervals partition the interval ((1− xi)T, T ) (with the exception of
up to m endpoints of these intervals); in particular,
∑
j≥i(zj − yj) = xi.
Let ε′ = minj(vj+1 − vj). Note that, if t ∈ (yjT + γT/ε′, zjT − γT/ε′), then for all j′ 6= j,
σj,t(vi) > σj′,t(vi) + γT . This follows since σj,t(vi)− σj′,t(vi) is linear in t with slope vj − vj′ , and
|vj − vj′ | > ε′. It follows that if t is in this interval, then the buyer will choose option j with
probability at least 1−mγ (by a similar argument as before).
Define j(t) = argmaxj σj,t(vi) to be the index of the arm with the current largest cumulative
reward, and let σmax,t(vi) =
∑t
s=1 rj(s),s(vi) be the cumulative utility of always playing the arm
with the current highest cumulative reward for the first t rounds. The following lemma shows
that σmax,T (vi) is close to maxj σj,T (vi). (In other words, playing the best arm every round and
playing the best-at-the-end arm every round have similar payoffs if the historically best arm does
not change often).
Lemma C.3. |σmax,T (vi)−maxj σj,T (vi)| ≤ m.
Proof. Let W = |{t|j(t) 6= j(t+ 1)}| equal the number of times the best arm switches values; note
that since each σj,t(vi) is linear, W is at most m. Let t1 < t2 < · · · < tW be the values of t such
that j(t) 6= j(t + 1). Additionally define t0 = 1 and tW+1 = T . Then, dividing the cumulative
reward σmax,t into intervals by these ti, we get that
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σmax,t(vi) =
t∑
s=1
rj(s),s(vi)
=
W+1∑
i=1
(σj(ti),ti(vi)− σj(ti),ti−1(vi))
= σj(T ),T (vi) +
W+1∑
i=1
(σj(ti−1),ti−1(vi)− σj(ti),ti−1(vi))
= max
j
σj,t(vi) +
W+1∑
i=1
(σj(ti−1),ti−1(vi)− σj(ti),ti−1(vi))
It therefore suffices to show that |σj(ti−1),ti−1(vi)− σj(ti),ti−1(vi)| ≤ 1 for all i. To see this, note
that (by the definition of j(t)), σj(ti−1),ti−1(vi) − σj(ti),ti−1(vi) > 0, and that σj(ti−1),ti−1+1(vi) −
σj(ti),ti−1+1(vi) < 0. However,
(σj(ti−1),ti−1+1(vi)−σj(ti),ti−1+1(vi)) = (σj(ti−1),ti−1(vi)−σj(ti),ti−1(vi))+(rj(ti−1),ti−1+1(vi)−rj(ti),ti−1+1(vi))
Since 0 ≤ rj,t(u) ≤ 1, it follows that |σj(ti−1),ti−1(vi) − σj(ti),ti−1(vi)| ≤ 1. This completes the
proof.
Let σT (vi) =
∑T
t=1 E[rIt,t(vi)] denote the expected cumulative utility of this buyer at time T .
We claim that σT ≤ maxj σj,T (vi)+o(T ). To see this, recall that, for t ∈ (yjT+γT/ε′, zjT−γT/ε′),
Pr[It 6= j] ≤ mγ, and therefore E[rIt,t] ≤ rj,t +mγ. Furthermore, note that for t ∈ Sj, j(t) = j, so
rj,t = rj(t),t and E[rIt,t] ≤ rj(t),t +mγ. It follows that
25
σT (vi) =
T∑
t=1
E[rIt,t(vi)]
≤
T∑
t=(1−xi)T
E[rIt,t(vi)]
=
i∑
j=1
zjT∑
t=yjT
E[rIt,t(vi)]
≤
i∑
j=1

2γT
ε′
+
zjT−γT/ε′∑
t=yjT+γT/ε′
E[rIt,t(vi)]


≤
i∑
j=1

2γT
ε′
+
zjT−γT/ε′∑
t=yjT+γT/ε′
(rj(t),t(vi) +mγ)


≤ 2mγT
ε′
+mγT +
T∑
t=1
rj(t),t(vi)
=
2mγT
ε′
+mγT + σmax,T (vi)
≤ 2mγT
ε′
+mγT +m+max
j
σj,T (vi)
= max
j
σj,T (vi) + o(T ).
Finally, note that
max
j
σj,T (vi) = max
j<i
(vi − vj + ε)xjT
≤ (max
j<i
(vi − vj)xj + ε)T
= (ui + ε)T
It follows that σT (vi) ≤ (ui + ε)T + o(T ), as desired.
We now proceed to show that this bound is in fact optimal; no strategy for the seller (even an
adaptive one) can achieve better revenue against a no-regret , conservative buyer.
Theorem C.4 (Restatement of Theorem 3.3). Any strategy for the seller achieves revenue at most
MBRev(D)T + o(T ) against a conservative buyer running a no-regret algorithm.
Proof. Assume the buyer is running a δ-no-regret algorithm, for some δ = o(T ). Consider an
arbitrary strategy for the seller with K arms, where arm j is labelled with maximum bid bj .
We begin by claiming that the following LP (Figure 3) provides an upper bound on the revenue
obtainable by this strategy against our no-regret buyer.
Lemma C.5. Let V ′ be the optimal value of LP ′ (see Figure 3). Then the expected revenue of the
seller is at most V ′T .
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maximize
m∑
i=1
qi(vixi − ui)
subject to ui ≥ viyj − pj − δ/T, i ∈ [m], j ∈ [K] : vi ≥ bj
pj ≤ bjyj, j ∈ [K]
xi = yj, i ∈ [m], j = arg max
j∈[K]:bj≤vi
bj
pj ≥ 0, 1 ≥ yj ≥ 0, j ∈ [K]
Figure 3: LP ′, with variables xi, ui, yj, and pj
Proof. Given our strategy for the seller, we will assign values to variables in the following way. Fix
a strategy for the buyer, and let yj =
1
T E [
∑
t aj,t] be the expected average probability that arm j
gives the item and let pj =
1
T E [
∑
t pj,t] be the expected average price charged by arm j. We will
define xi through the third constraint, and set ui = maxj(viyj − pj − δ/T ). We will show that this
assignment of variables satisfies all the constraints, and that the objective function evaluated on
this assignment of variables is at least the seller’s revenue using this strategy.
The first and third constraints are satisfied via our choices of xi and ui. The constraint pj ≤ bjyj
is satisfied since pj,t ≤ bjaj,t for all t. Finally, 0 ≤ yj ≤ 1 is satisfied since yj is an average probability.
We now must show that the seller’s revenue is at most qi(vixi−ui). We begin by claiming that
xi is an upper bound for the expected fraction of the time that the buyer receives the item when
he has value vi. To see this, note first that the buyer is conservative, and therefore will not bid
on any arm with bid value larger than vi. Choose j so that bj is maximized over all bj ≤ vi; note
that since the seller’s strategy is monotone, aj,t > aj′,t for any j
′ < j, so the buyer will receive the
item at most E
[
1
T
∑
t aj,t
]
= yj of the time in expectation. But by our third constraint, xi = yj,
so xi is an upper bound on the average probability that the buyer with value vi gets the item, and
therefore
∑m
i=1 qivixi is an upper bound on the average welfare of the buyer.
We next claim that
∑
i qiui is a lower bound for the average utility of the buyer. To see this,
note that since the buyer is using a δ-no-regret algorithm, when the value is vi, the buyer should
not regret always playing some arm j with wj ≤ vi. Therefore the average surplus of value vi
should satisfy the constraint on ui, and so
∑m
i=1 qi · ui is a lower bound on the average surplus of
the buyer.
Finally, note that the seller’s revenue is just the buyer’s welfare minus the buyer’s surplus.
Combining the upper bound on the buyer’s welfare and the lower bound on the buyer’s surplus, we
get our desired upper bound on the seller’s revenue.
We will now show how to transform a solution of this LP into a solution to the mean-based
revenue LP while ensuring that its value does not decrease by more than δ/T . To begin, it is easy
to see that there exists an optimal solution of LP ′ that satisfies pj = yj · wj for all j ∈ [K]. We
can thus increase each ui by δ/T , since this will decrease the value of the LP by at most δ/T as∑m
i=1 qi = 1. This solution now satisfies ui ≥ (vi−bj)yj for all i ∈ [m], j ∈ [K] : vi ≥ bj. Finally, for
each i, j ∈ [m] : i > j, note that for ℓ = argmaxℓ∈[K]:bℓ≤vj bℓ, we have that bℓ ≤ vj. It follows that
ui ≥ (vi− vj)yℓ = (vi− vj)xj , and therefore that this solution is a valid solution of the mean-based
revenue LP.
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From the above argument, we can conclude that V1 ≤ Rmb(D)+δ/T . It follows from Lemma C.5
that the total revenue is upper bounded by T (MBRev(D)+δ/T ) = Rmb(D)T +o(T ), as desired.
Note that the proof of Lemma C.5 relies on the fact that our allocation rule is monotone. We
can show that this constraint is necessary; with non-monotone strategies, the seller can extract up
to the full welfare of a conservative buyer playing a mean-based strategy. The proof of this fact
can be found in Appendix E.
C.2 Bounding MBRev(D)
In this section, we compare the mean-based revenueMBRev(D) to our two benchmarks: the Myerson
revenue for the item, Mye(D), and the buyer’s expected value for the item, Val(D). It is not
too hard to see that MBRev(D) ≤ Val(D) (the value of the mean-based revenue LP is clearly at
most
∑
i qivi = Val(D)) and that MBRev(D) ≥ Mye(D) (the seller can achieve Mye(D) by just
always selling the item the Myerson price). We show here that MBRev(D) is not a constant factor
approximation to either Mye(D) or Val(D), and thus lies strictly between our two benchmarks in
general.
We will begin by showing that MBRev(D) is monotone with respect to stochastic dominance.
We will break from notation somewhat by considering distributions D supported on [1,H] rather
than [0, 1]; since Mye(D), MBRev(D), and Val(D) are all linear in the values vi, dividing all values
through by H results restores the condition that D is supported on [0, 1] while preserving the
multiplicative gaps between these quantities.
Definition C.6. A distribution D stochastically dominates distribution D′ if for all t, Pru∼D[u ≥
t] ≥ Pru∼D′ [u ≥ t].
Lemma C.7. If distribution D stochastically dominates distribution D′, then MBRev(D) ≥ MBRev(D′).
Proof. Note that we can write MBRev(D) in the form
MBRev(D) = max
x
Evi∼D
[
vixi −max
j
(vi − vj)xj
]
To show MBRev(D) ≥ MBRev(D′), it suffices to show that for all increasing x (i.e. xi ≥ xj for
i ≥ j), that
Evi∼D
[
vixi −max
j
(vi − vj)xj
]
≥ Evi∼D′
[
vixi −max
j
(vi − vj)xj
]
Note that if D stochastically dominates distribution D′, then for any increasing function f ,
Eu∼D[f(u)] ≥ Eu∼D′ [f(u)]. It suffices to show that f(vi) = vixi −maxj(vi − vj)xj is increasing in
i (and hence in vi). In particular, we wish to show that, for i
′ > i,
vi′xi′ −max
j
(vi′ − vj)xj ≥ vixi −max
j
(vi′ − vj)xj
or equivalently,
min
j
(vi′xi′ − (vi′ − vj)xj) ≥ min
j
(vixi − (vi − vj)xj) .
To show this, it suffices to show that for each j,
vi′xi′ − (vi′ − vj)xj ≥ vixi − (vi − vj)xj
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or equivalently,
vi′xi′ − vixi ≥ (vi′ − vi)xj .
This follows since
vi′xi′ − vixi ≥ vi′xi − vixi
= (vi′ − vi)xi
≥ (vi′ − vi)xj .
Here we have used the fact that xi′ ≥ xi ≥ xj. This concludes the proof.
For ease of analysis, we will also switch to considering continuous distributions D. The defini-
tions of Mye(D) and Val(D) still hold for continuous D. Since the mean-based revenue LP implies
that, in the optimal solution, ui = maxj(vi − vj)xj , we can write MBRev(D) for a continuous D
supported on [1,H] with pdf q(v) as
MBRev(D) = max
x(v)
∫ H
1
q(v)(vx(v) −max
w<u
(v −w)x(w))dv.
By discretizing appropriately, all gaps we prove for continuous D extend to discrete values of
D.
Definition C.8. The equal revenue curve is the (continuous) distribution DERC supported on
[1,∞) with CDF F (v) = 1 − 1v . The equal revenue curve truncated at H is the distribution
distribution DERC(H) supported on [1,H] with CDF F (v) = 1 − 1v for v ≤ H and F (v) = 0 for
v > H.
Note that Mye(DERC) = 1 (since v(1−F (v)) = 1 for all v ≥ 1). Likewise, Mye(DERC(H)) = 1.
Lemma C.9. Let DERC(H) be the equal revenue curve truncated at H. Let D be any distribution
supported on [1,H] with Mye(D) = 1. Then DERC(H) stochastically dominates D.
Corollary C.10. The distribution D supported on [1,H] that maximizes MBRev(D) subject to
Mye(D) = 1 is the truncated equal revenue curve DERC(H).
Theorem C.11. MBRev(DERC(H)) ≥ Ω(log logH).
Proof. Note that for DERC(H), the pdf q(v) is given by q(v) = 1v2 , so
MBRev(DERC(H)) ≥ max
x(v)
∫ H
1
q(v)(vx(v) −max
w<v
(v − w)x(w))dv
= max
x(v)
∫ H
1
1
v
(
x(v)−max
w<v
(
1− w
v
)
x(w)
)
dv.
Here the maximum of x(v) is taken over all increasing functions from [1,H] to [0, 1]. Consider
the function x(v) = log vlogH . In this case, (v − w)x(w) is maximized when:
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ddv
((v − w)x(w)) = 0
(v − w)x′(w) − x(w) = 0
(v −w) 1
w logH
− logw
logH
= 0
w + w logw = v.
If we choose w so that the above inequality holds, then note that dv = (2+ logw)dw. It follows
that
MBRev(DERC(H))
≥ 1
logH
∫ H
1
1
w + w logw
(
log(w +w logw)−
(
1− w
w + w logw
)
logw
)
(2 + logw)dw
=
1
logH
∫ H
1
(2 + logw)
w + w logw
(
log(w +w logw)− logw + logw
1 + logw
)
dw
≥ 1
logH
∫ H
1
(2 + logw)
w + w logw
log(1 + logw)dw
≥ 1
logH
∫ H
1
log(1 + logw)
w
dw
=
log(H) log(1 + logH)− log(1 + logH)− logH
logH
= Ω(log logH)
Theorem C.12. MBRev(DERC(H)) ≤ O(log logH).
Proof. Note that, up to a point mass at H which contributes at most H(1/H) = 1 to the mean-
based revenue, MBRev(DERC(H)) is given by
max
x(v)
∫ H
1
1
v
(
x(v)−max
w<v
(
1− w
v
)
x(w)
)
dv.
Let f(v) : [1,∞) → [1,∞) be a function that satisfies f(v) < v for all v ∈ [1,∞). By choosing
w = f(v), we have that
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MBRev(DERC(H)) ≤ max
x(v)
(∫ H
1
1
v
(
x(v)−
(
1− f(v)
v
)
x(f(v))
)
dv
)
= max
x(v)
(∫ H
1
x(v)
v
dv −
∫ H
1
1
v
(
1− f(v)
v
)
x(f(v))dv
)
= max
x(v)
(∫ H
f(H)
x(v)
v
dv +
∫ f(H)
1
x(v)
v
dv −
∫ H
1
(
1
v
− f(v)
v2
)
x(f(v))dv
)
= max
x(v)
(∫ H
f(H)
x(v)
v
dv +
∫ H
1
x(f(v))f ′(v)
f(v)
dv −
∫ H
1
(
1
v
− f(v)
v2
)
x(f(v))dv
)
= max
x(v)
(∫ H
f(H)
x(v)
v
dv +
∫ H
1
(
f ′(v)
f(v)
+
f(v)
v2
− 1
v
)
x(f(v))dv
)
.
Choose f(v) = v1+log v . Note that, for this choice of f ,
f ′(v) =
log v
(1 + log v)2
,
and so
f ′(v)
f(v)
+
f(v)
v2
− 1
v
=
log v
v(1 + log v)
+
1
v(1 + log v)
− 1
v
= 0.
It follows that (since x(v) ∈ [0, 1] for all v)
MBRev(DERC(H)) ≤ max
x(v)
∫ H
f(H)
x(v)
v
dv
≤
∫ H
H/(logH+1)
dv
v
= log(logH + 1)
= O(log logH).
Corollary C.13 (Restatement of Theorem 3.5). The gap MBRev(D)/Mye(D) can grow arbitrarily
large. For distributions D supported on [1,H], this gap can be as large as Ω(log logH) (and this
is tight). Similarly, the gap Val(D)/MBRev(D) can grow arbitrarily large. For distributions D
supported on [1,H], this gap can be as large as Ω(logH/ log logH).
D Mean-based learning algorithms
In this appendix we will show that Multiplicative Weights and EXP3 - the most common adver-
sarial no-regret algorithms for the experts and bandits case respectively - are mean-based, as per
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Definition 2.3. We expect that many variants of these algorithms along with other no-regret learn-
ing algorithms are also mean-based, and can be shown to be mean-based via similar methods of
proof.
We begin by showing that Multiplicative Weights (Algorithm 3) is mean-based. Multiplicative
Weights, also known as Hedge (see survey [AHK12] for more details) is a simple no-regret learning
algorithm for the full-information setting. It proceeds by maintaining a weight wi for each option.
Every round, Multiplicative Weights chooses an option with probability proportional to wi, and
then updates each weight wi by multiplying it by e
εri , where ε is a parameter of the algorithm and
ri is the reward from option i this round.
Algorithm 3 Multiplicative Weights algorithm.
1: Choose ε =
√
logK
T . Initialize K weights, letting wi,t be the value of the ith weight at round t.
Initially, set all wi,0 = 1.
2: for t = 1 to T do
3: Choose option i with probability pi,t = wi,t−1/
∑
j wj,t−1.
4: for j = 1 to K do
5: Set wj,t = wj,t−1 · eεrj,t.
6: end for
7: end for
Theorem D.1. The Multiplicative Weights algorithm (Algorithm 3) is mean-based.
Proof. Define γ = 2(Tε)−1 log(Tε). We will show that Multiplicative Weights is γ-mean-based.
Note that since ε =
√
logK
T , γ = o(1) and therefore Multiplicative Weights is mean-based.
Note that wi,t = e
εσi,t . Therefore, if σi,t − σj,t < −γT , we have σi,t−1 − σj,t−1 < −γT + 1 <
−γT/2, it follows that
pi,t =
wi,t−1∑
j wj,t−1
≤ wi,t−1
wj,t−1
= eε(σi,t−1−σj,t−1)
< e−εγT/2
= e− log(Tε) = 1/(Tε) ≤ γ.
It follows that Multiplicative Weights is γ-mean-based.
Algorithm 4 Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader algorithm.
1: Choose ε =
√
logK
T .
2: for t = 1 to T do
3: For each arm, sample peri ≥ 0 independently from exp. distribution dµ(x) = εe−εx.
4: Choose option i with largest σi,t−1 + peri.
5: end for
We now show the Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader algorithm (Algorithm 4) is mean-based.
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Theorem D.2. The Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader algorithm (Algorithm 4) is mean-based.
Proof. Let γ =
√
1
T · log(T ). When σi,t < σj,t − γT , the probability option i is chosen at round i
is at most
Pr[peri > σi,t−1 − σj,t−1] = e−ε(σi,t−1−σj,t−1) ≤ e−εγT/2 <
√
1
T
< γ.
Therefore the Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader algorithm (Algorithm 4) is γ-mean-based.
We will now show that EXP3 (Algorithm 5) is mean-based. EXP3 can be thought of as an
extension of Multiplicative Weights to the incomplete information (bandits) setting. Since we no
longer observe every option’s reward each round, we cannot perform the same weight update rule
as in Multiplicative Weights. Instead, if we choose option i, we update weight wi by multiplying it
with eεri/pi , where pi is the probability of picking this option this round (i.e. wi/
∑
wj), and leave
all other weights unmodified. Since E[
ri,t
pi,t
1It=i] = ri,t, this accomplishes in expectation (in some
sense) the same update rule as Multiplicative Weights. It is known that (for fixed K) if ε = T−α
for some α ∈ (0, 1), then EXP3 is no-regret ([ACBFS03]). This regret is minimized when α = 1/2,
but for convenience of analysis we will show that EXP3 is mean-based when α = 1/4. EXP3 is still
no-regret when α = 1/4.
Algorithm 5 EXP3 algorithm.
1: Choose a parameter ε ∈ (0, 1). Initialize K weights, letting wi,t be the value of the ith weight
at round t. Initially, set all wi,0 = 1.
2: for t = 1 to T do
3: Choose option i with probability pi,t = (1−Kε) wi,t−1∑
j wj,t−1
+ ε.
4: Set wi,t = wi,t−1 · eεri,t/pi,t.
5: end for
Theorem D.3. The EXP3 algorithm (Algorithm 5) is mean-based.
Proof. We will set ε = T−1/4 and γ = 2(2
√
2 + 1)T−1/4 log T . We will show that EXP3 is γ-mean-
based.
Define σˆi,t =
∑t
s=1
ri,s
pi,s
· 1Is=i. Note that σˆi,t − σi,t is a martingale in t; indeed, conditioned
on the actions from time 1 up to time t − 1, E
[
ri,s
pi,s
· 1Is=i
]
= ri,s. In addition, note that∣∣∣εri,spi,s · 1Is=i − εri,s
∣∣∣ ≤ 1pi,s ≤ 1/ε, since pi,s ≥ ε by definition. It follows from Azuma’s inequal-
ity that, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ K, 1 ≤ t ≤ T , and M > 0,
Pr [|σˆi,t − σi,t| ≥M ] ≤ 2 exp
(
−M
2ε2
2T
)
.
We will choose M so that Mε =
√
2T log T ; for this M , it follows that
Pr [|σˆi,t − σi,t| ≥M ] ≤ 2
T
.
Now, note that wi,t = e
εσˆi,t . If σi,t − σj,t < −γT , we have σi,t−1 − σj,t−1 < −γT + 1 < −γT/2,
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it then follows that
pi,t = (1−Kε) wi,t−1∑
j wj,t−1
+ ε
≤ min
(
wi,t−1
wj,t−1
, 1
)
+ ε
= min(eε(σˆi,t−1−σˆj,t−1), 1) + ε
≤ eε(σi,t−1−σj,t−1)+2Mε + 2
T
+ ε
< e−εγT/2+2
√
2T log T +
2
T
+ ε
≤ e−
√
T log T +
2
T
+ T−1/4
≤ γ.
Finally, we prove Theorem 2.5, showing that the contextualization of a mean-based algorithm is
still mean-based. In particular, the contextualizations of the above three algorithms (Multiplicative
Weights, Follow the Perturbed Leader, and EXP3) are all mean-based algorithms for the contextual
bandits problem.
Theorem D.4 (Restatement of Theorem 2.5). If an algorithm for the experts problem or multi-
armed bandits problem is mean-based, then its contextualization is also a mean-based algorithm for
the contextual bandits problem.
Proof. Assume M is a γ-mean-based algorithm. We will show M ′ is 1minc Pr[c]
(
γ +
2
√
log(mKT )
T 1/2
)
-
mean-based.
First define σˆi,t(c) =
∑
s:s≤t, cs=c ri,s(c) to be the total reward given by arm i on rounds where
the context is c. Since M is γ-mean-based, whenever σˆi,t(c) < σˆj,t(c) − γT , then the probability
pi,t(c) that the algorithm pulls arm i on round t if it has context c satisfies pi,t(c) < γ.
We will proceed to show that σˆi,t(c) < σˆj,t(c)− γT with sufficiently large probability. It is easy
to check that E[σˆi,t(c)] = σi,t(c) · Pr[c]. By the Chernoff bound, we have that
Pr
[
|σˆi,t(c)− σi,t(c) · Pr[c]| ≥
√
T log(mKT )
]
≤ 2 exp(−2T log(mKT )/t) ≤ 2
T 2m2K2
.
By the union bound, with probability at least 2
Tm2K2
, we have |σˆi,t(c)− σi,t(c) · Pr[c]| ≥
√
T log(mKT )
for all i,t, and c. In this case we have that σi,t(c) < σj,t(c) − 1Pr[c](γT + 2
√
T log(mKT )) implies
that σˆi,t(c) < σˆj,t(c)− γT .
Therefore, if σi,t(c) < σj,t(c)− 1Pr[c](γT +2
√
T log(mKT )) and the context of round t is c, then
pi,t(c) < γ +
2
Tm2K2 ≤ ( 1minc Pr[c](γ + 1T 1/2 )).
E Full revenue can be achieved with non-monotone strategies
Theorem E.1. For any constant ε > 0, there exists a non-monotone strategy for the seller using
O(m2/ε) arms that gets revenue at least (1−ε)Val(D)T−o(T ) against a conservative buyer running
a γ-mean-based algorithm with γ = o
(
min(ε/m2, ε/(m · v1)
)
.
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Proof. Let M = m/ε and δ = 2γ/v1. Consider the following seller’s strategy:
1. The seller will provide M − i+ 1 arms with maximum value vi for i = 1, ...,m. For notation
convenience, label them as i ·M + 1, i ·M + 2..., i ·M + (M − i+ 1).
2. The j-th arm with maximum value vi (arm i ·M + j):
(a) For rounds in [(l− 1)T/M +1, (l− 1)T/M +2δT ], charge 0 and always give the item to
the buyer for l = 1, ..., i − 1.
(b) For rounds in [(l − 1)T/M + 2δT + 1, lT/M ], charge vl and always give the item to the
buyer for l = 1, ..., i − 1.
(c) For rounds in [(i− 1 + j)T/M + 1, (i− 1 + j)T/M + jδT ], charge 0 and always give the
item to the buyer.
(d) For rounds in [(i−1+ j)T/M + jδT +1, (i+ j)T/M ], charge vi and always give the item
to the buyer.
(e) For other rounds, charge 0 and don’t give the item to the buyer.
Let Ai,j = (i− 1 + j)T/M + jδT + 1 and Bi,j = (i+ j)T/M .
Lemma E.2. For each vi ∈ D, j = 1, ...,M − i + 1, and round τ ∈ [Ai,j , Bi,j], σi·M+j,τ(vi) >
σi′·M+j′,τ (vi) for all i′ ≤ i and (i′, j′) 6= (i, j).
Proof. First of all, by following the definition of the seller’s strategy, for τ ∈ [Ai,j , Bi,j], we have
σi·M+j,τ(vi) = vi · (2(i − 1) + j)δT +
i−1∑
l=1
(vi − vl)(1/M − 2δ)T.
There are several cases:
1. i′ ≤ i and j′ + i′ > j + i: for τ ∈ [Ai,j , Bi,j], we have
σi′·M+j′,τ (vi) = vi · (2(i′ − 1))δT +
i′−1∑
l=1
(vi − vl)(1/M − 2δ)T
≤ vi · (2(i − 1))δT +
i−1∑
l=1
(vi − vl)(1/M − 2δ)T
≤ σi·M+j,τ(vi)− vi · jδT
< σi·M+j,τ(vi)− γT.
2. i′ = i and j′ < j: for τ ∈ [Ai,j , Bi,j], we have
σi′·M+j′,τ (vi) = vi · (2(i− 1) + j′)δT +
i−1∑
l=1
(vi − vl)(1/M − 2δ)T
≤ σi·M+j,τ(vi)− vi · (j − j′)δT
< σi·M+j,τ(vi)− γT.
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3. i′ < i and j′ + i′ ≤ j + i: for τ ∈ [Ai,j , Bi,j], we have
σi′·M+j′,τ (vi) = vi · (2(i′ − 1) + j′)δT +
(
i′−1∑
l=1
(vi − vl)(1/M − 2δ)T
)
+ (vi − vi′)(1/M − j′δ)T
≤ vi · (2(i′ − 1) + j′)δT +
(
i−1∑
l=1
(vi − vl)(1/M − 2δ)T
)
+ vi ·max(2− j′, 0)δT
≤ vi · (2(i − 1) + j − 1)δT +
(
i−1∑
l=1
(vi − vl)(1/M − 2δ)T
)
≤ σi·M+j,τ (vi)− viδT
< σi·M+j,τ (vi)− γT.
It follows from the mean-based condition (Definition 2.4) that in the interval [Ai,j, Bi,j ] the
buyer with value vi will, with probability at least (1−Mmγ), choose arm i ·M + j. Since the buyer
has value vi for the item with probability qi, the total contribution of the buyer with value vi to
the expected revenue of the seller is given by
qi · vi ·
M−i+1∑
j=1
(1−mMγ)(Bi,j −Ai,j + 1) = qi · vi · (1−mMγ)(M −m)(T/M −mδT )
≥ qi (vi · T · (1−m/M)− o(T ))
≥ qi (vi · T · (1− ε)− o(T )) .
Then we have that the expected revenue of the seller is at least
∑
i
qi (vi · T · (1− ε)− o(T )) = (1− ε)
(∑
i
qivi
)
T − o(T )
= (1− ε)Ev∼D[v]T − o(T )
= (1− ε)Val(D)T − o(T ).
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